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acquisition, accuracy, and calibration
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Abstract
Errors in estimating and forecasting often result from the failure to collect and consider enough relevant information. We examine whether attributes associated with persistence in information acquisition can predict performance in
an estimation task. We focus on actively open-minded thinking (AOT), need for cognition, grit, and the tendency to
maximize or satisfice when making decisions. In three studies, participants made estimates and predictions of uncertain
quantities, with varying levels of control over the amount of information they could collect before estimating. Only
AOT predicted performance. This relationship was mediated by information acquisition: AOT predicted the tendency
to collect information, and information acquisition predicted performance. To the extent that available information is
predictive of future outcomes, actively open-minded thinkers are more likely than others to make accurate forecasts.
Keywords: forecasting, prediction, overconfidence, calibration, individual differences, actively open-minded thinking.

1

Introduction

ity dimensions that might be related to performance, and
seek an explanation for how they work.

Research in disciplines such as meteorology, statistics,
finance, and psychology has tried to measure and explain the relationship between people’s confidence in
their predictions and the accuracy of those predictions
(e.g., Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991; Harvey, 1997; Henrion & Fischhoff, 1986; Klayman, Soll,
González-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999). Overconfidence in
the accuracy of one’s estimates—sometimes called overprecision, to distinguish it from other types of overconfidence (Moore & Healy, 2008)—refers to the discrepancy between the confidence people have in the accuracy of their estimates, predictions, or beliefs and actual
accuracy rate. Overconfidence has proven to be robust
and difficult to remedy, although some interventions have
been partially successful (Haran, Moore, & Morewedge,
2010; Soll & Klayman, 2004; Speirs-Bridge et al., 2010).
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1.1 Prediction error and insufficient search
for information
Most studies attribute confidence-accuracy miscalibration to one of two shortcomings. The first is the underappreciation of uncertainty and sources of error (e.g.,
Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994; Gigerenzer et al., 1991;
Soll, 1996). Specifically, Juslin, Winman, and Hansson
(2007) argued that judges make two errors in transforming samples of information into an estimate: they perceive the sample as an exact, unbiased representation of
the estimated population; and they fail to acknowledge
that sample variances are smaller than population variances. As a consequence, their estimates often miss the
mark.
The second shortcoming is the tendency to focus on the
first answer that comes to mind, while failing to properly
consider alternative outcomes (e.g., McKenzie, 1998).
This failure to consider alternatives may come in the form
of an incomplete search for relevant information, failure
to retrieve available information from memory, or underweighting the importance or validity of information inconsistent with one’s initial hypothesis. The estimation
process begins with a search in memory for relevant information to provide a tentative answer. This tentative answer, once reached, biases the search and retrieval of new
information, as well as the interpretation of ambiguous
evidence, in favor of the initial conclusion (e.g., Hoch,
1985; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980).
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Building on this conceptualization, researchers have
tried to improve confidence-accuracy calibration by encouraging judges to direct more attention to alternative evidence and other possible answers. Fischhoff
and Bar Hillel (1984) instructed participants to look at
the problems they were solving from different perspectives. Others (Hirt & Markman, 1995; Morgan & Keith,
2008) asked forecasters to project multiple scenarios,
rather than imagine the one they deemed most probable. McKenzie (1997) explicitly told participants to take
the alternative into account before making an estimate,
whereas Koriat et al. (1980) instructed judges to generate self-contradicting arguments. These studies have reported modest success in reducing the discrepancy between the confidence judges displayed in their estimates
and their accuracy, not by increasing accuracy, but by reducing confidence.
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Is estimate quality an individual attribute?

& Grosch, 1990). For example, some evidence indicates
that men are more overconfident in their estimates than
are women (Barber & Odean, 2001). Calibration is also
related to expertise (Koehler, Brenner, & Griffin, 2002),
though not in every estimate format (McKenzie, Liersch, & Yaniv, 2008). Surprisingly, not many relationships have been found between accurate estimations and
personality attributes. Extraversion correlates negatively
with accuracy and calibration on various cognitive and estimation tasks (Lynn, 1961; Schaefer, Williams, Goodie,
& Campbell, 2004; Taylor & McFatter, 2003), but positively with short-term recall (Howarth & Eysenck, 1968;
Osborne, 1972). McElroy and Dowd (2007) found that
openness to experience was related to greater susceptibility to the anchoring bias. Finally, overconfidence
has been linked to proactiveness (Pallier et al., 2002),
narcissism (Campbell, Goodie, & Foster, 2004), selfmonitoring (Cutler & Wolfe, 1989), and trait optimism
(Buehler & Griffin, 2003).
Researchers have established a stronger link between
cognitive style and estimation performance. For example,
McElroy and Seta (2003) found that an analytic and systematic processing style correlated with reduced susceptibility to framing effects. Baron, Badgio, and Gaskins
(1986) assessed reflection/impulsivity in students, a dimension that corresponds to the speed vs. accuracy tradeoff in problem-solving. Those who are more reflective
take more time to reason before acting and deciding, a
tendency found to be related to better performance (i.e.,
a lower error rate, Kagan, 1965; Messer, 1970; Weiss
Barstis & Ford, 1977). In this paper, we examine four
dimensions of cognitive styles and their influence on the
accuracy of estimations.
Actively open-minded thinking.
Going beyond the
reflection/impulsivity construct, Baron (1993) developed
a reasoning style called actively open-minded thinking
(AOT). This style of thinking includes the tendency to
weigh new evidence against a favored belief, to spend
sufficient time on a problem before giving up, and to consider carefully the opinions of others in forming one’s
own. Research by Stanovich, West, and others (Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Sa, West, & Stanovich, 1999;
Stanovich & West, 1998) found that AOT was related
to a reduced susceptibility to belief bias—the inability
to decouple prior knowledge from reasoning processes.
This relative immunity to over-reliance on prior beliefs
might increase actively open-minded thinkers’ desire to
be more informed before making an estimate or prediction, and their higher attention to information already acquired may further improve their estimation performance.
Items of the Actively Open-minded Thinking Scale are
provided in the Appendix.1

Previous research has documented stable individual differences in calibration (e.g., Klayman et al., 1999; Wolfe

1 The scale was based on a much longer scale described by Stanovich
and West (2007; some of the items are listed by Sa et al., 1999), in stud-

1.2

Is considering more information better?

Infinite search for, and consideration of information prior
to an estimate will result in the most informed estimate
possible. These procedures, however, are costly in time
and effort, and their utility—the likelihood that the estimate based on them will be accurate—increases at a diminishing rate (Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010). According to
some (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & Van Baaren,
2006; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011), effortful search
and information processing may even decrease accuracy.
Judges, then, should be cognizant of an optimal point at
which they should stop their efforts, in order to increase
accuracy on the one hand, and avoid waste of resources
on the other (Baron, Badgio, & Ritov, 1991; Browne &
Pitts, 2004; Juslin & Olsson, 1997). While we agree that
too much processing can hinder efficient decision making, people rarely “overthink” before making an estimate
or forecast, and they have never been criticized for drawing conclusions from too large a sample. While proposed strategies for effective judgment vary greatly and
not all prescribe more search and deliberation, we seek to
identify the characteristics of persistent judges who acquire more information before estimating. We acknowledge that these individuals might not always make superior forecasts than those who collect less information.
Therefore, our studies measure not only information acquisition but also accuracy of estimations based on the
acquired information.

1.3
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Need for cognition. This cognitive style refers to the
tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Cohen (1957)
argued that individuals with a high need for cognition
were more likely to organize, elaborate on, and evaluate information. Cacioppo and Petty (1982) found that
this attribute predicted attitudes toward simple cognitive
tasks, relative to complex ones. Individuals with low
need for cognition enjoyed easier tasks, whereas those
with high need for cognition enjoyed more difficult tasks.
Kardash and Scholes (1996) found a relationship between
need for cognition and the tendency to properly draw inconclusive inferences from mixed evidence. People with
high need for cognition were less likely to jump to a conclusion when the evidence did not warrant it. Finally,
Blais, Thompson, and Baranski (2005) found a positive
relationship between need for cognition and accuracy in
judgment.
Grit. Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, and Kelly
(2007) developed the construct of grit as a complement
to intelligence in predicting success in academic contexts. They defined grit as perseverance and passion for
long-term goals. This trait includes the exertion of vigorous effort to overcome challenges and maintain effort
in the face of failure and adversity. The authors found
that, while grit did not correlate positively with IQ, it accounted for some of the variance in successful outcomes
of academics and professionals.
Maximizing vs. satisficing. Maximizing behavior is
aimed at achieving the highest expected utility (Simon,
1978). In choice, those who maximize look for the
best option, as opposed to those who satisfice, or choose
an alternative that is “good enough”. Satisficing is often linked to the use of heuristics in judgment and decision processes and is assumed to be more prone to
bias. Surprisingly, several studies have found the opposite pattern—that maximizers report more frequent engagement in spontaneous decision making (Parker, Bruine de Bruin, & Fischhoff, 2007) and display both lower
accuracy and greater overconfidence than do satisficers
in prediction tasks (Jain, Bearden, & Filipowicz, 2013).
These studies have tended to focus on judgment outcomes
and not on the process by which judgments are formed.
Therefore, we included this measure to test whether maximizers look for more information than satisficers before
deciding that they are sufficiently informed to make an
estimate.
These four attributes—AOT, need for cognition, grit,
and maximizing—are conceptually distinct. Actively
open-minded thinking refers to the consideration of evies of college students. The short form used here selected (and edited)
items that Baron deemed most relevant to a general population, not
just students, and that were most directly related to Baron’s conceptual
framework. They were then tested for reliability and refined further.
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idence prior to making a decision. Thus, we expected it
to be the most predictive of information acquisition in our
studies. Need for cognition is a general trait that reflects
the desire to think and exert mental effort. Grit and maximizing are even broader constructs, in the sense that they
are not limited to thinking tasks. Despite these conceptual
differences, all four variables may predict the willingness
to spend more time and effort in making an informed prediction.
We conducted three studies to examine the relationships between these attributes, persistence in information acquisition, and performance in an estimation task.
We measured individual attributes and elicited estimates
in both categorical and quantitative formats. We either
measured or manipulated the amount of information participants obtained prior to estimation. All three studies were conducted online. Participants were recruited
through Amazon.com Mechanical Turk (see Krantz &
Dalal, 2000; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010 for reviews of this participant pool and online data collection
in general).

2 Study 1
Participants made a series of categorical and quantitative estimates. We measured the four individual difference variables mentioned earlier, as well as the amount
of information participants acquired prior to each estimate. The goal was to examine whether the propensity
to acquire more information, as well as subsequent performance, could be predicted by any or all of the four
thinking-style attributes.

2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants and procedure
One-hundred eighty three U.S. based participants (97 females, Mean age = 35.28) completed an online survey
in exchange for $0.50 each. The study consisted of two
parts. The first part included four perception tasks, presented in an order chosen at random for each participant.
In each task, participants saw a number of objects of different types (i.e., 47 balls of four different colors, 25
emoticons of three different expressions, 42 mathematical characters of four types, 30 objects of four different
shapes; see Figure 1 for an example). The objects were
presented at random places on a computer screen for four
seconds at a time. Participants then estimated which object type appeared most frequently, rated their confidence
in the accuracy of this estimate, and provided an 80%
confidence interval for the total number of objects on the
screen.
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Figure 1: A sample stimulus used in Studies 1 and 2. Participants estimated which type of character was the most
frequent on the screen, as well as the total number of characters presented.

Persistence in information acquisition.
Participants
were permitted to view the objects as many times as they
wanted. Each time, the objects appeared in a different
random order for four seconds. After each presentation,
participants decided whether to view the objects again or
make an estimate. Persistence of information acquisition
was measured by the number of times participants chose
to view the objects.
Individual differences. After completing the four
tasks, participants answered questions about cognitive
styles and personality dimensions. These included, in
an order chosen at random for each participant, the
Actively Open-minded Thinking scale (See Appendix),
need for cognition (Cacioppo et al., 1984), the Short
Grit Scale (grit-s; Duckworth & Quinn, 2009), the
Maximization Scale (Nenkov, Morrin, Ward, Hulland,
& Schwartz, 2008), the Big 5 personality dimensions
(Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003), worry (Van Rijsoort, Emmelkamp, & Vervaeke, 1999), and the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005).

2.2

Results

Participants viewed the objects an average of 5.70 (SD
= 3.99) times. They achieved 2.87 (SD = 0.96) correct
choices in four tasks, or a 71.86% success rate. Participants reported 69.04% confidence, on average, in the accuracy of their choices in each task, which did not differ
significantly from their success rate, t(182) = −1.45, p =
.15. Participants were overconfident in their estimates of
the total number of objects presented. Their 80% confidence intervals for the total number of objects included
the actual numbers in only 2.08 of the 4 trials (SD = 1.35),
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achieving a success rate of 52.05%, significantly lower
than 80%, t(182) = 11.17, p < .001, d = 0.83.

2.2.1 The relationship between persistence of information acquisition and performance
The number of times participants chose to view the objects was a highly skewed distribution, therefore we used
a log(10) transformation of information acquisition. This
variable was related to accuracy in estimates of the most
frequent item type, r = .415, p < .001 as well as in the
confidence intervals for the total number of objects on
the screen, r = .311, p < .001, although no relationship
with was found with the width (log transformed) of these
confidence intervals, r = −.071, p = .34. More informed
participants also felt more confident about the accuracy
of their choices, r = .246, p = .001, and the calibration of these confidence assessments (measured by the
squared difference between confidence and accuracy) improved with the amount of information participants collected prior to their estimates, r = −.172, p = .02.

2.2.2 The role of cognitive styles in performance
Table 1 summarizes the correlations among the scores on
the four cognitive style measures. Multiple stepwise regression analyses revealed that AOT was the best predictor among the four variables, and the only variable that
predicted both information acquisition and performance.
Participants who scored higher on the AOT scale made
more accurate estimates of the most frequent object type
and their confidence intervals for the total number of objects included the correct answer more often. Scores on
the AOT scale correlated positively with openness to experience, r = .229, p = .002, and need for cognition, r =
.355, p < .001, as well as with performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test, r = .300, p < .001. However, none of
these other measures or any other measures in the study
was significantly related to performance on the experimental tasks (see Table 2).
We conducted a mediation analysis (Baron & Kenny,
1986) to test whether persistence of information acquisition mediated the relationship between AOT and performance. As Figures 2 and 3 show, persistence of information acquisition mediated the relationship between AOT
and performance, both in choosing the most frequent object type (full mediation) and in accurate confidence intervals for the total number of objects (partial mediation).
This suggests that high AOT individuals were more accurate because of their willingness to view objects more
often before making their estimates. These results persisted even after controlling for age and CRT score.
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Table 1: Correlations among the four cognitive style dimensions and other individual attributes measured in Study 1.

AOT
Need for cognition
Grit
Maximizing
Agea
Level of education
Cognitive reflection
a

AOT

Need for cognition

.355***
−.078
−.096
.212**
.053
.300***

.276***
.150*
.022
.125
.304***

Grit

−.055
.165*
.190*
−.024

Maximizing

−.204**
.127
.067

Log(10) transformed. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Figure 2: Results of mediation analysis for persistence in
search for information in the relationship between AOT
and choice accuracy in Study 1. Standardized coefficients
are presented. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Figure 3: Results of mediation analysis for persistence in
search for information in the relationship between AOT
and confidence interval hit-rate in Study 1. Standardized
coefficients are presented. ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

3 Study 2
2.3

Discussion

We expected to find a positive relationship between information acquisition and AOT. But the construct, AOT,
is also related to the consideration and processing of existing information. Similarly, estimate performance depends not only on the acquisition of relevant information,
but also on the effective processing of this information.
The mediation analyses suggest that in this study, AOT
worked by enhancing the former process: controlling
for persistence in information acquisition weakened the
relationship between AOT and performance. However,
the task employed in this study cannot distinguish between information acquisition and information processing. Therefore, in Study 2, we constrained participants’
ability to collect more evidence and measured their performance given a fixed amount of pre-estimate information.

Study 1 demonstrated that AOT influences performance
and is associated with a more persistent acquisition of information. In this study we sought to test whether there
are other ways by which high AOT individuals achieve
better performance, that are not related to information acquisition. Note that the items used to measure AOT are at
least as related to the willingness to consider more diverse
information and give more weight to evidence that challenges one’s prior opinion, as they are to the propensity
to search for new evidence (see Appendix). So, while not
being excessively focused on one’s prior belief leads actively open-minded individuals to acquire more evidence
prior to forming an informed opinion, high and low AOT
individuals may also differ in how they process information. To test this proposition, we kept the amount of information constant. Under these conditions, any difference
in performance could be attributed only to more effective information processing. If, on the other hand, performance will not correlate with AOT when information is
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Table 2: Results from stepwise regression analyses predicting information acquisition, correct choices and accurate
confidence intervals in Study 1. Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses.
Information acquisition

Correct choices

Accurate
confidence
intervals

Variablea

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Constant

0.238†
(0.12)
0.087**
(0.03)

0.017
(0.16)
0.091***
(0.03)
0.006*
(0.003)

−0.669**
(0.22)
0.066**
(0.03)
0.004
(0.003)
0.579***
(0.13)

1.908***
(0.40)
0.198*
(0.08)

1.531**
(0.44)
0.193*
(0.08)

−0.113
(0.56)
0.451***
(0.11)

AOT
Grit
Age b

0.102*
(0.05)

Level of
education
R2
∆R2
F
F for ∆R2

.063**
12.08

.085***
.023*
8.41
4.51

.174***
.088***
12.55
19.12

.032*
5.92

.054**
.022*
5.14
4.25

.081***
16.05

a

Need for cognition and maximizing were not included in any significant model. Among the other variables,
only variables included in any significant model are presented. b log(10) transformed † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p
< .01, *** p < .001.

constant, results would suggest that the relationship between AOT and performance is driven primarily by the
search for information.

3.1
3.1.1

Method
Participants and procedure

Two-hundred twenty U.S. based participants (100 females, Mean age = 31.85) completed an online survey, in
exchange for $0.50 each. They completed the same tasks
and questionnaires used in Study 1, except that they did
not determine the amount of information they acquired
prior to making their estimates. Rather, they were randomly assigned to three groups, varying in the amount of
information they received. One group viewed the objects
twice in each task before making an estimate. A second
group viewed the objects five times (the median number
of times participants viewed the objects in Study 1). The
third group viewed the objects eight times. We predicted
that more information would lead to better estimates, but
that, without the ability to control the amount of information acquired, AOT would not predict performance.

3.2 Results and discussion
Participants correctly estimated the most frequent object
type 2.71 times (SD = 0.98), on average, out of four tasks,
achieving a 67.73% success rate. They displayed underconfidence, by reporting 63.04% confidence, on average,
in the accuracy of their choices in each task, t(219) =
−2.73, p = .007, d = 0.19. Participants’ 80% confidence
intervals for the total number of objects included the actual number 1.58 times (SD = 1.06) on average, achieving
a success rate of 39.50%. This performance level was significantly lower than the assigned 80% confidence level
to each confidence interval, t(219) = 22.67, p < .001, d =
1.53, implying overconfidence.
Table 3 shows the results of the different information
conditions. More information was related to more accurate choices of the most frequent object type, r = .169,
p = .01 and higher average confidence in each choice, r
= .358, p < .001, although these relationships were not
observed in confidence interval estimates.2 The means
2 Confidence interval hit-rate: r = −.058, p = .39; Estimated confidence interval hit-rate: r = .033, p = .63.
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Table 3: Performance measures by amount of information participants received prior to estimating in Experiment 2.
Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
Condition/Measure
2 times
5 times
8 times

Rate of correct
choices

Average confidence
in choice

Rate of accurate 80%
confidence intervals

Average confidence
interval width

61.0% (22.4)
71.7% (23.5)
71.0% (26.2)

55.7% (16.0)
63.7% (16.0)
70.1% (14.9)

40.6% (28.4)
41.3% (27.1)
36.8% (23.8)

15.5% (8.0)
14.5% (12.9)
14.9% (23.0)

provided in Table 2 suggest that viewing the objects 8
times did not improve participants’ performance relative
to those who viewed the objects 5 times, which may be
attributed to fatigue.
Did actively open-minded thinking predict estimate accuracy when participants could not control the amount of
information? The answer is no. Multiple stepwise regression analyses reveal that, while the number of times the
objects were presented to participants predicted performance on the choice tasks, B = 0.067, R2 = .029, F(1,218)
= 6.45, p = .01, but not confidence intervals, B = −0.025,
R2 = .003, F < 1, none of the cognitive styles or other
individual attributes we measured predicted performance
on either task, all Bs ≤ 0.112, all ts ≤ 1.69, all ps ≥
.1. Without the opportunity to conduct a more thorough
search for information, neither AOT nor any other variable was related to performance.
These results are consistent with those of Study 1, in
which participants could collect as much information as
they wished prior to estimating. In Study 1, individuals with higher AOT gathered more information and performed better. In Study 2, participants were given a fixed
amount of information and could not control the amount
they deemed sufficient for making an estimate, and, here,
AOT was not related to performance. This suggests that
the better performance of high AOT individuals in Study
1 was not due to the use of information already obtained,
but rather to their tendency to gather more information.
The failure of AOT to predict performance when information acquisition is held constant seems, at first glance,
at odds with the definition of AOT as giving sufficient
weight to new information or information that is inconsistent with prior beliefs. However, participants in Study 2
did not have a chance to form a prior belief before receiving the information; they knew nothing of the makeup
of object types before the tasks, and so had no reference point for considering new information. Nevertheless, performance in Study 2 did not imply differences in
the processing of information between individuals differing in AOT, suggesting that the performance differences
observed in Study 1 were due to differences in information acquisition.

4 Study 3
In this study, we sought to replicate our previous findings
in a more naturalistic prediction setting. The added realism addresses three concerns about Studies 1 and 2. First,
the tasks in these studies were unusual. We wanted to ensure that the effects of AOT and information acquisition
also held in more realistic contexts. Therefore, we created a platform for predicting outcomes of sports games.
Second, in the first two studies, all pre-estimate information items were equally valid and helpful for accuracy.
Real events, however, are less predictable. From warm,
sunny days in the middle of winter to the fall of longstanding dictatorships, some events are not ones a wise
gambler would bet on, but they may nevertheless occur.
Studies 1 and 2 suggested that AOT predicted estimate
accuracy when judges could collect valid information. In
this study, we predicted that the relationship would hold
only when the prior information available was positively
correlated with the outcome. For example, when predicting the outcome of a football game, one may use the information about the teams’ record leading up to the game,
and predict a win for the team with the better record (i.e.,
the favorite). If this team wins, then the prediction, which
was consistent with the available information, was also
accurate. However, if the team with the worse record (i.e.,
the underdog) ends up winning, then the prediction was
inaccurate, although it was still consistent with the information available at the time. Therefore, we also measured predictions’ coherence, that is, the degree to which
predictions were consistent with prior information (Dunwoody, 2009). Finally, in this study we introduced a monetary incentive for prediction accuracy.

4.1 Method
4.1.1 Participants
Two-hundred U.S. participants (87 females, Mage =
32.36) completed an online survey, for a flat $0.50 fee
plus a 1/50 chance to win a $10 prize. Additional $2
prizes were awarded to the ten participants with the most
accurate predictions.
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4.1.2

Procedure

This experiment consisted of two parts. While the second part included the same battery of questionnaires used
in the previous two studies, the first part was a new prediction task. Participants were asked to predict the outcomes of ten games that took place during one week of a
National Football League season. To minimize unwanted
effects of expertise, we chose a mid-season week in a past
season, which was not revealed to participants.3
For each game, participants were told the names of
the home team and the road team and predicted the winner. At the bottom of the screen, there were two buttons, one for “Information” and one for “Estimate”. Each
time they clicked the “Information” button, participants
received one of ten facts about one or both teams, in a
random order. These facts included a team’s record (overall, home/away games, and division/conference/interconference games), a team’s recent performance (last
game, five games, or current streak), a team’s offensive
and defensive rankings, the outcome of the two teams’
last meeting, and injuries to significant players, if there
were any. After each fact was presented, participants
went back to the previous screen, where they could click
on “Information” again to receive another fact, or on “Estimate” to advance to the prediction of the winner.
After making all ten predictions, participants reported
their level of expertise in football (on a 1-9 scale, ranging
from “I know nothing” to “Expert”) and proceeded to the
battery of individual attribute questionnaires.

4.2

Results and discussion

Participants made an average of 5.65 correct predictions
out of 10 (SD = 1.36). They requested 2.11 facts (SD =
2.47), on average, before making each prediction. The
average level of confidence in the accuracy of their predictions was 70.59% (SD = 11.29), implying overconfidence of 14.09%, t(199) = 11.62, p < .001, d = 0.82. Performance correlated positively with expertise, r = .182, p
= .01, meaning that self-reported experts performed better than novices.
Four of the ten games resulted in upsets, meaning that
the team with the inferior record leading up to the game
beat the team with the better record.4 For these four
games, information provided about teams’ past performance was harmful, rather than helpful. This difference was indeed evident in the data: predictions for the
3 Specifically, we used games from week 12 of the 2003 season. This
was the first point in the season (after week 2) at which all teams had
played an equal number of games. The choice of season was arbitrary.
At the end of the prediction task, participants were asked to guess the
season from which the games were taken; none guessed correctly.
4 This rate of upsets is consistent with the historical average in the
NFL (Ben-Naim, Vazquez, & Redner, 2006).
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Figure 4: Results of mediation analysis for persistence in
search for information in the relationship between AOT
and accurate predictions in games won by the favorite in
Study 3. Standardized coefficients are presented. * p <
.05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

non-upset games were correct more frequently (63% of
the time) than predictions for the upset games (46.75%,
which was almost significantly worse than chance, t(199)
= 1.73, p = .08). More importantly, pre-game information acquisition was related to better prediction accuracy
of non-upset games, r = .311, p < .001, but to lower accuracy in games that yielded unexpected outcomes, r =
−.504, p < .001. Therefore, we analyzed the two sets of
games (upsets and non-upsets) separately.
For non-upset games, we conducted multiple stepwise regression analyses of information acquisition, performance, confidence and overconfidence, including the
four cognitive styles and expertise. AOT was the only
variable that predicted information acquisition and performance (see Table 4). All other variables were nonsignificant. As Figure 4 shows, the relationship between
AOT and performance was partially mediated by persistence of information search. Similar to Study 1, high
AOT participants acquired more information and made
more correct predictions than low AOT individuals.
Games with upsets, where more information was related to worse performance, showed a different pattern.
Multiple stepwise regression analyses reveal that, while
AOT was again the only variable to predict persistence of
information acquisition, it did not predict either performance or confidence. Correctly estimating these surprising outcomes was rather related to expertise (see Table 5).
In fact, the relationship between AOT and performance
in these games was negative and almost significant, B =
−.127, t(199) = −1.80, p = .07. As Figure 5 shows, controlling for persistence in information acquisition eliminated this relationship.
To test the hypothesis that AOT predicted the extent to
which participants relied on the information they could
acquire before making an estimate, we measured the co-
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Table 4: Results from stepwise regression analyses predicting information acquisition, correct estimates, confidence
and overconfidence in one’s estimates of games in which the better team won in Study 3. Unstandardized regression
coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses.
Information
acquisition

Correct
estimates

Confidence

Variablea
Constant
AOT

Overconfidence
Model 1

−0.980
(0.97)
0.092**
(0.03)

2.623***
(0.39)
0.034**
(0.01)

66.441***
(2.04)

32.915***
(8.86)
−0.745**
(0.26)

39.83***
(9.36)
−0.652*
(0.26)

1.007*
(0.43)

Expertise

−2.414*
(1.13)

Level of
education
R2
∆R2
F
F for ∆R2

Model 2

.052**
10.82

.043**
9.00

.027*
5.49

.041**
8.50

.063**
0.022*
6.59
4.54

a

The analyses included the four cognitive style variables, expertise, age, and level of education.
Only variables included in any significant model are presented. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Figure 5: Results of mediation analysis for persistence in
search for information in the relationship between AOT
and accurate predictions in games won by the underdog
in Study 3. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

Figure 6: Results of mediation analysis for persistence in
search for information in the relationship between AOT
and prediction coherence in Study 3. Standardized coefficients are presented. ** p < .01; *** p < .001.

herence or consistency between the predicted outcome
and the outcome implied more likely by the pre-estimate
information. If higher AOT is linked to greater information acquisition and greater reliance on the information
when making predictions, then higher AOT individuals
should display greater consistency with prior information
than lower AOT individuals. Our results support this prediction. A multiple stepwise regression analysis reveals
that AOT was the only significant predictor of consis-

tency, B = .217, R2 = .047, t(199) = 3.13, p = .002. As Figure 6 shows, this relationship was fully-mediated by the
number of pre-game facts acquired, suggesting that the
degree with which estimates followed pre-estimate information depended on the amount of information acquired.
To summarize, this study replicated the findings of
Study 1 in a naturalistic prediction setting. Actively openminded thinking was related to information acquisition
and greater prediction coherence, or consistency between
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Table 5: Results from stepwise regression analyses predicting information acquisition, correct estimates, confidence
and overconfidence in estimates of games that resulted in upsets in Study 3. Unstandardized regression coefficients
are reported, with standard errors in parentheses.
Information
acquisition

Correct
estimates

Variablea, b
Constant
AOT

−1.071
(0.98)
0.091**
(0.03)

Expertise

Confidence
Model 1

Model 2

1.446***
(0.15)

65.072***
(1.43)

72.562***
(3.83)

0.102**
(0.03)

1.338***
(0.30)

1.343***
(0.30)
−0.090*
(0.04)

.048**

.090***

.110***
.020*
12.23
4.43

NFC
R2
∆R2
F
F for ∆R2

.050**
10.50

10.02

19.69

a

The analyses included the four cognitive style variables, expertise, age, and level of
education. Only those who were included in any significant model are presented. b The
analysis revealed no significant predictors of overconfidence. * p < .05. ** p < .01, *** p
< .001.

the prediction and the information acquired. When the
outcome was consistent with the acquired information,
AOT led to greater accuracy, but when the outcome was
an upset (i.e., inconsistent with the information), higher
AOT was associated with greater coherence and worse
performance. High AOT individuals collected more information and used it when making their predictions.
However, with invalid information, this strategy backfired.

5

General discussion

Estimations of present outcomes and predictions about
future outcomes can be difficult, if not impossible, tasks.
Prior research has produced evidence that people insufficiently search for relevant information before making
estimates. But as yet, there is no cure. We investigated
variables that predicted differences in the tendency to be
persistent in information search. Contenders included
actively open-minded thinking (AOT), need for cognition, grit, and maximizing. In three studies, we tested
these variables’ relationship with persistence in information acquisition, and whether they predict estimate accuracy and calibration. We used two different methods of

estimating—item-confidence and confidence intervals—
which have been shown to differ in the degree of accuracy
and overconfidence they produce (Juslin, Wennerholm, &
Olsson, 1999).
The only variable related to information acquisition
and performance was AOT. This variable predicted accuracy in both categorical and quantitative estimates.
Higher AOT was related to higher persistence in search
for information, higher accuracy of estimates and lower
overconfidence (though not via reduced confidence). Persistence of information acquisition mediated the relationship between AOT and performance. In Studies 1 and 3,
high AOT individuals acquired more information, which
in turn resulted in better performance when information
was helpful for producing accurate estimates. In Study 2,
when the amount of available information was kept constant, AOT had no effect on performance.
Study 3 introduced the concept of prediction coherence, or the degree to which predictions were consistent with available information. For highly-probable outcomes, more coherent predictions were also more accurate. However, for an improbable outcome, in our case
an inferior team beating a superior team in an NFL game,
coherence was related to lower accuracy. AOT was as-
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sociated with greater coherence; higher AOT individuals
performed better when games were not upsets and worse
in games that resulted in upsets. When information was
misleading, high AOT individuals were more susceptible
to invalid information. In an uncertain world, event outcomes do not always fully match prior information about
them. But as long as the information is at least somewhat
predictive, coherence should have a positive relationship
with accuracy, and AOT should be helpful in making accurate estimates and predictions.
The mediating role of information acquisition in the relationship between AOT and estimation performance can
potentially explain the effects of AOT found in prior research. For example, AOT’s role in reducing belief bias
(Sa et al., 1999) may be related to high AOT individuals’ propensity to search for more available information,
whether in their environment or in memory, before answering. AOT might also have an influence on other
problems in judgment and decision making. The positive
effect of information acquisition on confidence interval
hit-rate we found is consistent with the findings of Haran
et al. (2010), whose Subjective Probability Interval Estimate (SPIES) method improved calibration of confidence
intervals by preventing judges from ignoring alternative
outcomes. It is possible that these results were achieved
by making all participants behave as high AOT individuals are naturally inclined to, and make a conscious effort
to obtain more relevant information during the estimation
process.
Actively open-minded thinkers’ inclination to search
and consider new information might also be observed in
choice settings. Iyengar and Lepper (2000) found that
large choice sets have a negative impact on consumer
satisfaction. AOT might play a role in this effect. One
possibility is that, by considering more information about
choice attributes, high AOT individuals might experience
a more severe choice overload than low AOT individuals.
Another possibility is that high AOT individuals are less
prone to choice overload, and that they demonstrate this
by not being reluctant to collect more information in their
evaluation of the choice set.

6

Limitations and future directions

The objective of this research was to test whether cognitive styles predict persistence in information search
and estimation performance. AOT was found to predict both. Other aspects of the construct, not related to
information acquisition, should be investigated. These
include the willingness to spend time on problems and
to weigh information that contradicts one’s prior beliefs.
Although these aspects of AOT were not central to our
research question, they may demonstrate additional ways
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by which AOT affects predictions and decisions, such as
enhancing Bayesian updating upon receiving information
that is inconsistent with an initial belief.
Future research should also explore whether AOT affects retrieval of evidence from memory as it does acquiring new information. Research sometimes treats available (though not yet acquired) information and known
information as the same. For example, accounts of some
forms of “confirmation bias” describe ignorance, or underweighting, of information that contradicts a prior belief, similarly when this information is already known to
the judge as when it is provided by an external source as
new evidence. However, not looking for new evidence
can be seen as an act of omission, whereas discounting
known information might be a more deliberate act. Investigating the role of AOT in reducing bias in the processing of these two types of information can shed light
on possible differences between these two processes.
Another influential factor (which we did not examine)
in forecasting is expertise. We elicited self-ratings of expertise in American football in Study 3, but the specific
items we used for forecasting, i.e., games from an unknown past season, were unrelated to actual prior knowledge. Future research should test interactions between
AOT and domain expertise in predicting estimation performance.

6.1 Can AOT be taught?
Baron (1993, 1994) has advocated the teaching of adaptive cognitive thinking styles, including AOT. Baron et al.
(1986) conducted an 8-month course of decision making,
consisting of hypothetical examples, practice exercises
and feedback, aimed at instilling a consistent reduction
in students’ susceptibility to bias. Perkins, Bushey, and
Faraday (1986) conducted a similar course, in which they
taught students to search for arguments on both sides of
an issue and consider all relevant arguments. Both training programs improved thinking skills and processes.
Our studies demonstrate a positive relationship between
AOT and better forecasting. If these interventions can
cause changes in forecasting skills, they should be used
to train forecasters. Our search tasks could be used to
assess such improvement.

6.2 Concluding remarks
This work builds on previous research on individual differences in prediction aptitude. Actively open-minded
thinking (AOT) predicted persistence in information acquisition as well as accuracy and calibration of estimates.
High AOT individuals invested more effort in acquiring
information, which, in turn, improved the quality of their
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estimates. To the degree that this skill can be taught, it
should be used to improve forecasting.
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Appendix:
The Actively OpenMinded Thinking Scale
Please rate your agreement or disagreement with each
statement on a 1 to 7 scale, where 1 = Completely Disagree, 4 = Neutral, and 7 = Completely Agree. (LAST 4
should be reverse coded).
1. Allowing oneself to be convinced by an opposing
argument is a sign of good character.
2. People should take into consideration evidence that
goes against their beliefs.
3. People should revise their beliefs in response to new
information or evidence.
4. Changing your mind is a sign of weakness.
5. Intuition is the best guide in making decisions.
6. It is important to persevere in your beliefs even
when evidence is brought to bear against them.
7. One should disregard evidence that conflicts with
one’s established beliefs.

